flying.farther

The memory of the past thus makes the present move; it puts back on their feet, in view of a new beginning, those who are prostrate in the silence and oppression of exile.

Of course, there is memory and memory. There is the memory that is nothing but the simple act of the memorization of static events one pulls out from the past the way one takes some yellowed photos out from the back of a drawer. Such a memory, imaginatively idealizing the past as “the good old days when things were so much better,” is counter-productive; instead of mobilizing energies to take on present tasks it plunges one into the lethargy of a dream-past. Shrunk to the size of an anecdote, this past, from which one has washed away whatever there was of suffering, struggle, promise of a future, has no more history: it is a simple memory, as J.-B. Metz has said, that has been robbed of its future.

But there is also the memory that is a living act of commemoration. It is in this act of communal memory a people or a group regenerates itself. The past of its origins is snatched out of its “pastness” to become the living genesis of today. This today is thus received as “present,” as a “gift of grace.” It is thus a process of revivification, where the memory of sufferings experienced, of oppression undergone, and of the fight undertaken to liberate oneself play an essential role: tomorrow will better than yesterday; and the present is full of this living hope. Every project concerning the future seems rooted in the awakening of such a tradition: humanity has a future only because it has a memory. Totalitarian governments know this well; their strongest weapon is rubbing out the collective memories of the groups they oppress, beginning, where this is strategically possible with their language. For a group sees its identity being erased insofar as it loses its collective memory or insofar as this memory is no longer the anticipatory carrier of a possible new future. “Revolutions” show this: whenever it is declared that the future is realized, whenever it is declared that eschatology is fully present, it is urgent to invent a new utopia under pain of dying.

Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence, Translated by Patrick Madigan, S.J., and Madeleine Beaumont, pg. 233-234.

R. O. Flyer wanted to see the thesis statement, but I just figured I’d post the introduction. So, whatcha think?

Introduction
Subverting Torture
This thesis first understands itself in relation to torture. While much of the thesis itself may not mention torture explicitly, and in fact could be used as the foundation for a political theology that engages more than just torture, the reader should not forget that each argumentative turn is made with torture in mind. The thesis functions in this unusual way because it attempts to strike at the fundamental logic of torture by the state, instead of getting lost in the mire of case studies that use the threat of immanent danger to justify manipulative violence. Quite simply, I am subverting the whole discussion as I ask again and again, “Why should we torture?”

While this thesis is chiefly arguing at levels deeper than the specific action of torture, it is both deconstructive and constructive at the same time. I identify and argue against some of the first assumptions, while proposing a re-oriented economy – a different ontology, epistemology, etc. – all first grounded in the identity of a savior who suffered and the community of faith that follows suit. Therefore, the second question driving the argument is, “What should we look like if we are to be a people who refuses torture?”

Consequently, the problem this thesis seeks to address is the American Christians’ quiet acceptance of torture. Despite how little this thesis may actually mention torture, implicit in each move is the subversion of a theology that allows for current American theology to be either apathetic towards or blasé about torture (since most Christians do not seem to explicitly support torture) or, even worse, candidly protorture.

Assumptions
This thesis has many presuppositions, but I shall touch on a few of the most important. I first assume that torture is morally and ethically wrong, and that torture should not be used. This is not a discussion on the justification of torture, for that is a whole other argument worthy of its own time; rather, this thesis understands torture as a form of violent conversion used by the state and, as such, is to be handled with considerable suspicion.

Secondly, I assume, as hinted above, that Christianity is a deeper association than the citizenship in a nation-state or one’s cultural-economic participation. Christianity is cosmically rooted. At the same time, Christians are defined by the culture they live in. Therefore the politics of the body of Christ is a complex mixture of the existential situation in the present and the rule of God. In the end, however, the basileia informs the space and time of the here and now, resituating one’s ontological understanding and praxis within the cultural milieu at hand.

I also assume that Christianity does not naturally merge well with the nation-state or bourgeois market. In fact, Christianity can function as an antagonistic and an interrupting movement: “Christians are bearers of the subversive, dangerous memory of the suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.”1 Therefore, Christianity critiques society through the church’s formative discipleship rooted in the remembrance of Jesus.

Lastly, I assume that political theology, as Johann Baptist Metz asserts, must begin with engaging history, because historical consciousness regularly reforms our current identity and thus allows for the continual, interrupting praxis of solidarity.2 As such, any engagement with or construction of a body politic must address the historical discussion of one’s cultural genesis. In this case, the historical myths America asks its citizens to believe, in contrast to the example of Jesus and the political implications of his life and message, are no longer uncritically assumed canonical stories, but instead are now subject to suspicion. Such critical interrogation will shed light on the negative and oppressive nature of the American story.

I also speak in explicit Christian categories. Quite simply, I champion a way of acting and being for Christians in America; I promote an imagining of the ecclesia in the confluence of subversive communal-being and visible, liberative action-speak. After reviewing what torture actually is, I address deep assumptions, such as memory and willful self-blindness, inherent in the American story that are counter to a Christological ecclesiology.

In light of the basic assumptions, the thesis will also cut both ways, against both theological liberals and conservatives, because I do not fault the Christian Right alone. Rather, I put forth William Cavanaugh’s critique of the nation-state and Eugene McCarraher’s Catholic/Marxist critique of capitalism, who both take aim at the theological complicity and structural compromise of American Christianity as a whole.

Thesis
As stated earlier, this thesis is a writing on torture. More specifically, it develops a political theology which subverts any current American theology that seems apathetic to torture, blasé about torture, or worst of all, resolutely pro-torture. To be more percise, 9/11, as a microcosm of the greater American story, is used by the privatizing nation-state as an identity-forming, eschatological event (a “Christological” event within a larger colonizing context) that supplants the life of Jesus and the cross and resurrection and works with the commodifying market to break down the Christian call and community of Christians in America. And, just as the Christian story of the cross does not end with death, so too the nation-state supplies a hope for a grand future. However, this future is an anthropocentric future, most vividly seen in Ronald Reagan’s hope, which was wrapped around a perverted, humanly controlled and realized salvation of fear, anger, and violence. The state’s story and justification for violence – to ensure “safety” (the status quo) in the face of fear – become the ruling meta-narrative.

The outcome is a breakdown and reversal of relationships and allegiance and the end result is a Christian public polity that is at least indifferent to violence by the state. Accordingly, the body of Christ is no longer forged by the memory and promise of the cross and resurrection, if it indeed continues to exist as a body. The solution to engaging American Christianity against torture, then, is to bring to bear Johann Metz’s idea of “dangerous memory” and an explication on the political implications of church movement – liturgical/sacramental theology. Metz reorients Christians to the identity-forming memory of the Christological life, and it is in liturgy that Christians solidify themselves and act out, resulting in a politically prophetic movement by the church.

This political theology is an attempt to re-narrate the church in America. Such an act will hopefully place the church on the margins, with the marginalized. Christendom of old will not be resurrected, nor will the modernist project continue to hold sway. Instead, both the theologically liberal and theologically conservative will be moved in the direction of a politically liberative praxis championed by a community formed through the remembrance of Christ.

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1. Lieven Boeve, God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval (New York: Continuum, 2007), 203.

2. Johann Baptist Metz, Faith in History and Society: Toward a Practical Fundamental Theology, translated by J. Matthew Ashley (New York: Herder and Herder, 2007), 150-155.

I’m curious as what the theoblogosphere thinks of my following MA thesis:

I plan on writing on torture, more specifically, developing a political theology that subverts current American theology that seems apathetic or blasé on torture (since most do not seem explicitly for torture, but even if that were not case, the political theology I envision would cut against those pro-torture as well).

To distill the thesis I envision, I summarize it as such: 9/11, as a microcosm, is used by the privatizing nation-state as an identity-forming, eschatological event (a Christological event within a larger colonizing context) that supplants the cross and resurrection, and works with the commodifying market to breakdown the Christian call and community of Christians in America. The state’s story and justification for violence to ensure “safety” (the status quo) in the face of fear becomes the ruling narrative. Because the Christian body is no longer forged by the memory and promise of the cross and resurrection, if it indeed continues to exist as a body, the outcome is a breakdown and reversal of allegiance and relationships and the end result is a Christian public that is at least indifferent to violence by the state. The solution to engaging American Christianity against torture then is to bring to bear the Metzian idea of “dangerous memory” and an explication on the political implications of church movement – liturgical/sacramental theology. Metz reorients Christians to the identity forming memory of the Christological life and it is in liturgy that Christians solidify themselves and act out resulting in a prophetic movement by the church that is inherently political.

Any ideas? Praise and glory is welcome, helpful criticism even more so.

This post is partly a response to Religion, Politics, and the Christian Right: Post-9/11 Powers and American Empire by Mark Lewis Taylor, but it also begins the outlining work for the preface of my MA thesis.

Mark Lewis Taylor quite frankly stated his thesis for the book: “9/11 is best interpreted as a ‘mythic moment’ that temporarily ruptured the great myths of American Greatness by which many U.S. residents live” (xi). But the popping of the American bubbles of innocence and safety is not the end for the scope of the book, Taylor continues on to summarize the American response to such an attack: “groups already steeped in cultures of felt defeat and embattlement [i.e. the Christian Right] have harnessed the fear and patriotism of the post-9/11 moment for their ends” (69). Within this context of perceived violation and violent response, Taylor follows the Christian Right as it powers its way through politics, primarily through yoking with the neocons, the rich of wallstreet, and to whom the rich give money – Bush. Taylor then puts forth a response founded in his conception of prophetic spirit and a spirit that is inclusive for both Christian and non-Christian alike.

I liked this book, but that comes as no surprise since Taylor touched on the foundation for my thesis. On one hand I am actually annoyed someone already put this together in a similar way as I have planned, after all I spent a lot of time and my own thought getting to my position without the aid of Taylor. But on the other hand, it is reassuring to see someone else making similar moves, particularly someone who has a readership, and I realize the differences between Taylor and I can only make my argument stronger.

The first difference I noted was that Taylor hardly, if ever, mentions memory, instead he starts with the myth believed, characterizes it and moves on. I plan to start at deeper assumptions like memory and willful self-blindness. It seems from this distinction alone, that Taylor is writing to a different audience; he is writing about those Christians who believe the myths (interestingly he calls them Constantinian Christians a couple of times) while I will be writing both at and about. Also, without talking about memory, it does not leave him the thematic connection to use Metz and his conception of dangerous memory, which I think functions very well within prophetic spirit. Taylor, I suppose, did not have to talk about memory for his argument to hold, but it does feel less substantial.

Taylor also seems to collapse the myths that the Christian Right believes, and while I think there is greater value in distinguishing the myths, Taylor in a very short time and in his own way still summarizes the over all effect of the myths and explicitly makes the connection between Reagan’s hope. Despite Taylor’s seemingly simplification of the myths, he still describes the big picture well and so I do not think I can fault him for the simplicity.

I will write a thesis that cuts across both conservative and liberal movements, as opposed to Taylor’s critique of the Christian Right and some Liberalism, then again, I will be speaking in explicit Christian categories, while Taylor was choosing to address a broader audience. My thesis will cut both ways also because I do not plan on making a Constantinian turn in my argument and faulting the Christian Right alone, rather I will put forth William Cavanaugh’s critique of the nation-state and its anthropological implications for both conservatives and liberals. Despite how much I value the prophetic spirit – which I also see as the viable response to the state and culture – still latent within the prophetic spirit, as explicated by Taylor, seems to be an anthropology derived from our individualizing, enlightenment social contract (the constitution) as opposed to a Christian anthropology of organic relationship.

I also noticed that Taylor mentioned next to nothing about American terrorism. I do not think it a coincidence that because Taylor did not address innocence, or lack there of, Taylor did not also address American terrorism. However, Taylor did mention the idea of American righteousness, and this seems to be a move that covers similar ground at a quicker speed. For Taylor’s vision of the book, with a simplified version of American myths, talking of righteousness begins to strike at what innocence covers without all the argumentation. This was a good way to shore up his arguments, but I still wish he had talked about it to fill out both an explication about the Christian Right and his argument.

My last observation is not a compare and contrast, but noting once again that I was struck at how similar 9/11 and the Christological event of the cross function similarly. In fact I would venture to say, within the nation-state’s myth, creed and liturgy, 9/11 functions theologically as Christ’s cross – deaths of the innocent at the hand of this great monolithic, terrorist evil. I would also continue to say that this “messianic vision” subverts the Christian story and the Christian cross (44). 9/11 as used by the nation-state is a theological subversion of Jesus Christ. And as the Christian story of cross does not end with death, so to does the nation-state supply a hope of the grand future – however an anthropocentric future – most vividly seen in Reagan.

In Review, Myths America Lives By

Myths America Lives By is written very carefully and very lucidly. In fact, the writing was so simple that it almost felt like cheating to read this book for graduate level credit. Nevertheless, the book will prove incredibly helpful as a list and when it provides background information.

In fact, the book can be rather careful when it speaks of history; I only encounter the important distinction between Constantine (legalized Christianity) and Theodosius (made Christian the Empire’s religion) in careful historical scholarship. However, other aspects of history related by Hughes are less than helpful and generally revolves around what seems to be an acceptance of historical assumptions by Enlightenment figures.

Certainly Hughes can expertly slip into the voice he is speaking for, but at times his language indicates that he has not always critically reviewed certain views of history, or at least does not make these assumptions visible to the reader. The most blaring problem is his lack questioning the Enlightenment’s revisionist history which was used as a justification for an Enlightenment “intervention” in world events and subsequently the assumption about religious wars during the European’s early modern period, which is the same historical reading as Hughes.1

However, all is not lost. I was entirely unaware of Tyndale’s influence on the myth of a chosen nation and I am sure the new information will prove useful.2 Still, the carefulness to include Tyndale as source perplexes me all the more – Hughes was careful in quite a few areas, but did not interrogate Edward Lord Herbert’s historical assumptions/justifications.

While there are some historical inconsistencies, the book does an excellent job describing the myths. But better than that, the collection of myths are all in one book and so the focus of the book is in the most helpful place, an exclusive focus on the myths and how the myths interact. Still, the greatest strength of the book is the inclusion of the African American voice that puts the white dream into stark relief with reality.

I do have one last objection, I disagree with Hughes on the level at which some of the myths can be accepted. Perhaps I am coming from a different vantage point, with explicit Christian categories and a hermeneutic of suspicion when reading the stories that nation-states tell. I simply reject the myths of a Chosen Nation and Christian Nation (which in my mind become virtually one). The myths of Nature’s Nation and the Millennial Nation seem to replace the Christian idea of eschatology and hope. American Capitalism as myth just feeds greed, which Hughes seems to also convey. And lastly, I do agree with Hughes that the myth of Innocent Nation is just delusional.

For My Research, Myths America Lives By

Remembering rightly, once it breaks past the 9/11 barrier, ought to extend to critically looking our other myths that function as the bedrock for the 9/11 story. This is where Myths America Lives By plays its part. Once our fake innocence is stripped away and the delusion gone, the more foundational myths are accessible for critique and deconstruction. More importantly, the wide-ranging affects to our psyche that the fundamental myths have created can be examined as well; the subtle and seemingly unnoticeable changes to theology by the nation-state’s myths can finally be made visible.

Right remembering is honest memory, or at least as honest as one can be (which includes accepting and integrating the memories and voices of others). Thus, the inclusion of the African American voice in this book is invaluable. The myths go pop in the face of reality and on that basis this book achieves a terrific goal – the death of innocence.

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1. Hughes, 47, 48, 52. For a critical analysis of the Enlightenment’s historical justifications, see William Cavanaugh’s work Theopolitical Imagination.

2. Hughes, 21.

In Review, The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World

Admittedly this is my first Miroslav Volf book. I’ve put off Exclusion and Embrace for sometime, but I find myself being drawn towards it as pluralism and Christian community boundaries come into conversation within my head. As for the Volf’s The End of Memory, I like it, but not for all the reasons Volf wrote for. I can hear the voices of some fellow Union students yelling at how this book can be misused by the oppressor to avoid the violent acts of oppression and tell the violated to just forgive. I wonder most how much of Volf’s contextual experience can transfer to social ethics.

Overall, as a work on its own, I think it can be fruitful, but only in very specific, contextualized circumstances, as Volf makes clear. Nevertheless, I found some other interesting conclusions, primarily about remembering rightly in the first half, that will have vast ramifications. The important sections for me were: the first half, the last two chapters and the postscript.1 However, when reading this book, one really should finish it, since Volf lays out a full argument concerning forgiveness. It was also a very readable book and could go quick in most places I think.

Above all, the book is very personal and ultimately that is one of the best points about the book, specifically as the book does not claim to work towards a social ethic of forgiveness, but claims to speak only about particular relationships. The End of Memory is worth a read by people looking to work on personal relationships.

For My Research, The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World

For my purposes I think his book will work well for a few specific points. I am writing my thesis on torture centered around why the American church so easily accepts the violence and where we can work on our theology to fix the holes that lets the acceptance of torture stand. To this end, insomuch that Volf engages with Johann Metz (which is a rather small section, sadly) and the idea of remembering rightly, I think there is a richness that I can explore for my own purposes and has certainly moved my thoughts into critically examining our idea of the past. What follows are thoughts that have been generated by reading The End of Memory.

Remembering rightly as criticism can be, and should be, focused on our current ideas of memory – do we in fact remember rightly? What memories do we have, particularly in relation to torture and ourselves? Critically examining our sense of remembering means we begin at what we perceive to be the beginning, September 11. However, we are ignorant of or in arrogant agreement with pre-9/11 American action because of false myth – we simply do not remember, or rightly remember, American action pre-9/11. Thus, 9/11 as a “surprise” instilled and continues to instill fear and instability. Now, with the false myth of surprise, we react and remember through a lens of national safety and the need for preparation – militarization and pre-emptive violence; we do not remember rightly, nor care to solve the problems of inequality or violence, instead we remain blind to our actions – past, present and the consequences for the future.

Remembering rightly ought to heal and set relationships aright, otherwise through merely remembering, we begin falling into a cycle of sadism or masochism under the guise of geopolitical and personal safety. Memory translates into action, but how and what we choose to remember maintains a clear relationship to what we do.2 Therefore, anything that is leading people into violence and unhealthy relationships must be examined and re-examined, for it is quite possible memories are not being considered rightly. This becomes the basis for critically examining 9/11 and eventually the other myths that create America.

We ought to reconsider and look at 9/11 through entirely different lenses – not with concerns for national safety but with salvation and redemption in mind, for those are the Christian categories and it is those categories that govern our politics, or at least ought to. Simply put, we must look for reconciliation for our perceived innocence is false and our justified anger is poisonous (as will be noted later).

Forgetting cannot happen without reconciliation.3 And perhaps “not bringing to mind,” in Volf’s idea of forgetting, may be beyond humanities’ reach on this side of the judgment day, however, it is telling when we refuse to forget. We do not want to “forget” for we do not want to reconcile; we want to punitively damage through our self-perceived innocent hurt and justified anger and so we say we will never forget the pain to drive us on in our quest for revenge.

Lastly, Volf considers Johann Baptist Metz, but for not very long.4 Volf critiques Metz for not including the redemption of oppressors. Well, to be more exact, Volf uses a gap in Metz to leap into Volf’s own understanding of the passion. I say gap because the context and direction from which Metz worked in had little to do with the oppressor, but more about theodicy. Nevertheless, Volf is right, that when one considers liberation, there are two groups of people in need of salvation, the oppressor and oppressed and thus, Volf’s writing on the memory of the passion and memory of wrongs will prove helpful.

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1.In fact, it seemed to me that the chapter “Defenders of Forgetting” on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Freud seemed out of place – as if a footnote took on a life of its own, growing beyond the nuances of a theological footnote, and demanded space so as to pre-empt any criticism using the three thinkers. I think this chapter would have done well to work more as a postscript or appendix and then move the current postscript into the meat of the work where it really should be. This is a work on specific forgiveness and the testament to working out one’s own attempt to forgive would have done better directly within the work.

2. Volf, 67-71.

3. Volf, 181.

4. Volf, 113-117.